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LOUISIANA'S NEW MATRIMONIAL REGIME
LAW: SOME ASPECTS OF THE EFFECT ON REAL
ESTATE PRACTICE
William H. McClendon, HI*
Louisiana's new Matrimonial Regime Law' incorporates
changes which will have a profound effect on real estate prac-
tice in Louisiana and which will require a re-examination of the
law by the judiciary and the Bar to pinpoint those practices 2
now prevailing that do not comply with its provisions. Major
conceptual changes include the granting to spouses of a legal
capacity to contract with each other; the redefinition of the
nature of each spouse's interest in community property; and
the establishment of new requirements for the manner in which
that interest may be alienated or encumbered. The real estate
* Member of the Louisiana Bar Association.
This article, written in the Fall of 1978, does not reflect any changes in the law
since that date.
1. LA. R.S. 9:2831-56 (Supp. 1978), referred to herein as the "Matrimonial Re-
gime Law," was enacted by section 1 of Act 627 of the Louisiana legislature of 1978.
The Act contains a total of 12 sections:
Section 1-adding LA. R.S. 9:2831-56-Matrimonial Regime Law;
Section 2-adding LA. R.S. 9:1517-marital portion;
Section 3-amending LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1790 and 1791-capacity of spouses to
contract;
Section 4-amending LA. R.S. 9:291-suits between husband and wife;
Section 5-repealing LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1751 and 2446-capacity of spouses to
contract;
Section 6-repealing LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2325-2437-former community prop-
erty law;
Section 7-repealing LA. Civ. CODE art. 131-capacity of wife to contract as
public merchant;
Section 8-repealing the former law dealing with marriage contracts and respec-
tive rights of the parties in relation to their property;
Section 9-providing for the scope of the Act and its effective dates;
Section 10-providing: "The source notes, comments, and special notes con-
tained in this Chapter reflect the intent of the legislature.";
Section 11-regarding the general provision as to invalidity of any provision;
Section 12-repealing all conflicting laws.
2. Until this new law is interpreted by our courts, attorneys practicing in the area
of real estate will have to anticipate the changes in documentation that will be neces-
sary under the new Act. Only time will permit an exhaustive review of the entire
history of this new law and reveal the total effect on future real estate practice in
Louisiana.
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practitioner must now view the documentation of a real estate
transaction through two sets of lenses-when drafting instru-
ments he must consider what documentation will conform ex-
plicitly to the requirements of the law, and when examining
prior documentation prepared by other attorneys he must con-
sider, before approving a title as marketable,3 what will satisfy
the minimum requirements of future title examiners acting
under the then prevailing standards. These viewpoints are
more important and the problems more complex at a time
when entire civil law concepts and established jurisprudence
are changing.
The new act uses the term "matrimonial regime" exten-
sively and defines it in section 2831, as regulating "the owner-
ship and management of the assets and liabilities of married
persons, and in relation to their property, their rights and obli-
gations with respect to each other and to third persons."4 This
term apparently will not be the counterpart to the term
"community of acquets or gains" utilized in the present law,5
but rather will be used generally to conceptualize the legal fact
of a property relationship existing between married persons by
3. Distinction should be made between title which is merchantable (marketable)
and title which is insurable. Merchantable (marketable) title is determined by an
attorney's examination of the mortgage and conveyance indices, and other public
records, and has been defined by the Louisiana Supreme Court as a title "not sugges-
tive of serious litigation." Schaub v. O'Quin, 214 La. 424, 38 So. 2d 63 (1948). The
Louisiana Supreme Court, in Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So. 2d 27 (1963), stated:
[NIot all seeming defects render a title unmerchantable, especially those based
on objections which are obviously groundless; it is when there are outstanding
rights in third persons (not parties to the action) who might thereafter make
claims of a substantial nature against the property, and hence subject the
vendee to serious litigation, that the title is deemed not merchantable.
Id. at 1101, 1102, 150 So. 2d at 29 (emphasis by the court).
For example, the courts have held title to be defective when property acquired by a
married woman with a separate property declaration is conveyed without the signature
of her husband. Johnson v. Johnson, 213 La. 1092, 36 So. 2d 396 (La. 1948); Bachino
v. Coste, 35 La. Ann. 570 (1883).
An insurable title, on the other hand, is one which will be insured by an insurance
company authorized to do business in this state. The words merchantable and insura-
ble are not synonymous because a title insurance company might be willing to insure
without exception a title which technically would be unmerchantable.
4. LA. R.S. 9:2831 (Supp. 1978). The comment to section 2831 states: "This
provision is new. It defines a matrimonial regime, a term used throughout this Title.
The definition is consistent with civil law usage."
5. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2325-2437.
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virtue of their marriage-whether it be a "contractual regime",
modified, limited, or excluded by contract between the
spouses, or the "community of gains or legal matrimonial re-
gime"' established by law absent a contract adopting a com-
munity or matrimonial regime of their choice.
LEGAL CAPACITY OF SPOUSES TO CONTRACT WITH EACH OTHER IN
ESTABLISHING, MODIFYING, OR TERMINATING A MATRIMONIAL
REGIME
Under the new legislation a contract establishing, modifying
or terminating the contractual matrimonial regime may be en-
tered into at any time before or during the marriage.' This
leniency effects a conceptual change, for it has long been estab-
lished under statutory law9 and jurisprudence'0 that marriage
contracts can be entered into only before the celebration of
marriage, or, for parties married outside the state of Louisiana,
within one year after settlement in Louisiana. Under present
law, the celebration of marriage in effect freezes the rights of
the parties under the prenuptial contract, none of the provi-
sions of which can be changed while the marriage lasts," except
when the community is terminated by suit for "separation from
bed and board'" or separation of property 3 and not re-
established."
6. LA. R.S. 9:2833-35 (Supp. 1978).
7. LA. R.S. 9:2836-54 (Supp. 1978).
8. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978).
9. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2329.
10. The rule that all stipulations which the law permits to be made in marriage
contracts may be altered by husband and wife jointly before the celebration of mar-
riage, but not afterwards, was very early established in Desoby v. Schlater, 25 La. Ann.
425 (1871). As the parties bind themselves at the time of marriage, so they remain
bound as long as the marriage lasts.
11. Desoby v. Schlater, 25 La. Ann. 425 (1871). When property and income of
the wife are excluded from the community by antenuptial contract, administration by
the husband does not transform the property from separate to community; income
therefrom is taxable in full to the wife as her separate income, even though the property
is in fact administered by the husband. Clay v. United States, 161 F.2d 607 (5th Cir.
1947). See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2325-27, 2329, 2332, 2386, 2402, and 2424.
12. LA. CiV. CODE art. 155.
13. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2425-37.
14. LA. Civ. CODE art. 155.
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Form of Marriage Contract
Under the new law, the only requirement for establishing
by contract a matrimonial regime for those married persons
domiciled in this state, 5 or domiciled without this state but
owning immovable property within this state," is that the con-
tract be an act passed before a notary public and two wit-
nesses, 7 a stipulation which is not inconsistent with present
law'8 or jurisprudence." The present requirement 0 recently has
been applied rigidly to require execution by both parties at the
same time before notary and two witnesses.2' This precludes
the use of private acts executed by the parties before two wit-
nesses and acknowledged by the parties or proved by oath of
one of the subscribing witnesses or even acknowledged with the
same two witnesses and parties later signing before a notary
public.2 Presumably this requirement will be equally applica-
ble under the new legislation, and until changed by the legisla-
ture, the private act duly acknowledged in any form should not
be used, particularly in light of the courts' tendency to apply
15. LA. R.S. 9:2836 (Supp. 1978). This provision applies regardless of whether the
parties were domiciled in Louisiana at the time of marriage.
16. Id.
17. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978).
18. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2328 reads, "Every matrimonial agreement must be made
by an act before a notary and two witnesses."
19. According to Fleitas v. Richardson, 147 U.S. 550 (1892), a decision interpret-
ing Louisiana law, a prenuptial agreement is properly executed if done before a notary
public and two witnesses.
20. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2328. In accordance with Civil Code article 2234, an au-
thentic act is one executed before a notary public or other officer authorized to exercise
such functions and two witnesses aged at least fourteen years, or three witnesses if a
party to the act be blind. If a party does not know how or is unable to sign, the notary
must have him affix his mark, and mention should be made in the act of the reason
for using a mark in lieu of a signature.
21. See Rittner v. Sinclair, No. 9421 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978), in which the
Fourth Circuit held a premarital agreement invalid for want of form, because the
parties went to the notary's office separately and signed at different times.
22. All acts may be executed under private signature except such as are expressly
required by law to be passed in the presence of a notary public and two witnesses. LA.
CIv. CODE art. 2240. An act under private signature duly acknowledged has the same
legal effect and binds parties to the same extent as though passed in authentic form.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2242. Public registry protects the rights of third parties, and Civil
Code article 2253 provides for the acknowledgment of the private act prior to recorda-
tion in order to be effective against creditors or bona fide purchasers of real property.
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rigidly the requirement that the marriage contract be executed
in a specified form.
Additionally, if either of the parties to the agreement be a
23minor, the new legislation requires that the contract contain
the written concurrence of the minor's mother and father, or
the parent having legal custody of the minor, or the tutor of the
person of the minor.24 Under the present law it is rare indeed
for a minor emancipated by marriage to move to Louisiana and
enter into a marriage contract. Under the new law, however,
this may not be so rare due to the probable proliferation of such
contracts. What will be the legal capacity of a married person
to enter into a marriage contract affecting immovable property
when the person is (1) between the ages of sixteen and eighteen,
and (2) below the age of sixteen? In the former situation it
would appear that the person, by marrying before execution of
the marriage contract, is fully emancipated and thereby avoids
the necessity of obtaining written concurrence of parents or
tutor; under the latter, it would appear that while no parental
concurrence is required, court authority may still be necessary
although the new law is silent on this point.
Under the new law the matrimonial regime contract is not
effective against third parties until filed for registry in the
23. A "minor" is any person under the age of eighteen years. LA. CIV. CODE art.
37. The minor may be emancipated by notarial act at age fifteen, thus acquiring the
power of administration over his estate, LA. CIV. CODE art. 366, with the limitation that
until age eighteen there can be no alienation or encumbrance of his property without
court authorization. LA. CIV. CODE art. 373. This emancipation for purposes of adminis-
tration only is revocable. LA. Civ. CODE art. 377. The minor may also be emancipated
by marriage, LA. CIV. CODE art. 379, which emancipation is irrevocable. LA. CIV. CODE
art. 383. In Re Greer, 184 So. 2d 104 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), held that a thirteen-
year-old girl was emancipated by marriage and upon her husband's death she did not
resume her previous legal inability to contract, but retained her full legal capacity to
prosecute a wrongful death action in the courts. A married person below the age of
sixteen has only the power of administration of his estate and cannot alienate, affect,
or mortgage any of his immovable property without court authorization. LA. Civ. CODE
art. 382. A minor may be emancipated by judicial decree at the age of sixteen, LA. Civ.
CODE art. 385, and the minor is then relieved of all disabilities which attach to minor-
ity.
24. LA. R.S. 9:2835 (Supp. 1978). Under present law an unemancipated minor
may enter into a marriage contract, but only with the consent of both parents, or the
survivor if one is dead, or the tutor if both are dead. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 97, 1785, 2330.
In Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 323 So. 2d 120 (La. 1975), the prenuptial contract was
declared null by reason of the fact that the wife was an unemancipated minor at the
time of its execution, and, although the mother signed the contract, the father did not.
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mortgage records of the parish in which the spouses are domi-
ciled and, in relation to immovables, of the parish where the
immovable is situated."5 According to prior jurisprudence, it
does not appear to be necessary that such an act, after being
filed for registry, be indexed, photocopied and recorded as long
as it can be shown that the act was filed for registry.27 The
25. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978). In East Baton Rouge Parish the mortgage office
presently maintains a mortgage index by name only (not by property description) for
documents placed in the following books: Mortgage, Charter, Federal Tax Lien, Paving
Lien, Registered Agent, Judgment, Weed Lien, Partnership, Sheriff's Bond, Federal
Land Bank, Crop Pledge, Bond and Special Mortgage. Documents for all other books
are indexed in the conveyance records. Under the present law it has been held that an
act of sale must be recorded in the conveyance records to have effect against third
parties, and recording the sale in the mortgage office is the same as not recording the
deed. Bona fide titles and mortgages, if not recorded in the proper conveyance or
mortgage office, have always been preempted by subsequent titles and mortgages duly
recorded. See, e.g., Levench v. Toby, 6 La. Ann. 462 (1851); Tulane v. Levinson, 2 La.
Ann. 787 (1847).
26. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978). Under present law marriage contracts affecting
immovable property are to be recorded in the conveyance records. LA. Civ. CODE arts.
2264-66. Conveyance records are the only thing to which one dealing with the convey-
ance of realty needs to look, and innocent third parties are not bound by any knowledge
except as is disclosed by those records. LA. R.S. 9:2721-22 (1950); LA. CIv. CODE arts.
2254, 2264, 2266; Cole v. Richmond, 156 La. 262, 100 So. 419 (1924); Hasslocher v.
Recknagel, 160 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 245 La. 964, 162 So. 2d 14
(1964). Acts affecting immovable property should be recorded in the parish where the
immovable is situated, and where more than one piece of property is affected, LA. R.S.
44:138 (Supp. 1954) authorizes the recordation of certified copies of instruments of
writing affecting immovables in more than one parish. Such recordation has the same
effect as the recordation of the original instrument.
27. The recordation of a conveyance of immovable property under Civil Code
article 2266 is effective from the time the act is deposited in the proper office and
endorsed by the proper officer. Schneidau v. New Orleans Land Co., 132 La. 264, 61
So. 225 (1913). A mortgage is also effective from the time of filing, but only if it is
timely inscribed. LA. R.S. 9:5141 (1950); Kinnebrew v. Tri-Con, 244 La. 879, 154 So.
2d 433 (1963); Note, Security Devices-Mortgages on Immovables-When Effective
Against Third Persons, 25 LA. L. REv. 783 (1965). LA. R.S. 9:5141 provides that mort-
gages, when filed, shall be immediately indorsed by the recorder with date, hour, and
minute of filing, which shall be recorded with the registry of the instrument, and all
such instruments shall be effective against third parties from the time of filing. The
Kinnebrew court concluded that the intent of section 5141 was to place mortgages on
the same footing as conveyances with reference to their registry-that is, to make them
effective against third parties from the time of being deposited with the recorder, at
least if the acts are timely and duly inscribed. 244 La. at 890, 154 So. 2d at 437.
Under the public records doctrine established in McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152,
51 So. 100 (1910), third parties are held to constructive knowledge of that which is of
public record, and an erroneous indexing does not affect the validity of the recordation
of an act of sale. The index is for convenience only and not a part of the official record.
Agurs v. Belcher & Creswell, 111 La. 378, 35 So. 607 (1903).
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prevailing practice in some areas of running only the convey-
ance indices in the name of the current owner will not be suffi-
cient under the provisions of this new law to detect the pres-
ence of matrimonial regime contracts and amendments which
could have the effect of a conveyance without being recorded
in the conveyance records.
Substance of Marriage Contract
With respect to the substance of the matrimonial regime
contract, section 2833 provides, in effect, that the parties will
be free to contract as they wish-modifying or limiting the
matrimonial or community regime, excluding it altogether, or
electing to be separate in property. However, the parties may
not through this contract renounce or alter the marital portion
or the established order of succession or prohibit gratuitous
dispositions permitted by law.28 The provisions of the contrac-
tual matrimonial regime may be made retroactive if they do
not prejudice the rights of third parties.2' Those provisions of
the legal regime that the parties have neither excluded, lim-
ited, nor modified, will be in effect.30 Because of the broad
freedom provided in section 2833, presumably the contract
could contain a provision, inter alia, for one spouse to confer
upon the other full and complete authority to acquire, alienate,
encumber or otherwise deal with community property, mova-
ble or immovable. If this be so, why would section 2843 provide
that the power of attorney from one spouse to the other to
alienate, encumber or lease community immovables must ex-
pressly describe a particular community immovable and, by
implication, may not confer this authority generally with re-
spect to all immovables of the community?3' Could it be argued
28. LA. R.S.'9:2833 (Supp. 1978). For the new provision dealing with the marital
portion, see LA. R.S. 9:1517 (Supp. 1978).
29. Comment (b) to LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978) provides:
.A matrimonial regime contract is subject to the general rules of conventional
obligations except as specifically provided in this Title. For example, this Sec-
tion authorizes retroactive provisions in a matrimonial regime contract but such
provisions may not prejudice the rights of third persons. See Articles 1969 and
1502 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. . ..
30. LA. R.S. 9:2833 (Supp. 1978). The provisions of the legal matrimonial regime
referred to are found in LA. R.S. 9:2836-54 (Supp. 1978).
31. LA. R.S. 9:2843 (Supp. 1978). See text at notes 144-52, infra.
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that a power of attorney executed by both spouses as principal
and agent before a notary public and two witnesses constitutes
a type of marriage contract and therefore is governed not by the
provisions of section 2843 but by section 2833? Apparently the
provisions of section 2833 could be used to circumvent the re-
quirements of section 2843.
Legal Matrimonial Regime
The provisions of the new legal matrimonial regime char-
acterize the property of married persons as either community
or separate, with section 2838 regulating the community prop-
erty and section 2839 regulating the separate property of the
spouses. Under the latter, separate property comprises things
belonging to the spouse prior to the marriage, things acquired
by the spouse with separate assets or with separate and com-
munity assets when the amount of the community investment
is inconsequential, and things acquired by the spouse by inher-
itance, donation or bequest. The donation by one spouse to the
other of community property also transforms into separate
property an equal portion of the donee's interest therein and
the fruits and revenues thereof unless the act of donation stipu-
lates to the contrary. The fruits and revenues of other separate
property, however, constitute separate property only when an
act passed before a notary public and two witnesses reserving
them as separate property has been filed in the mortgage re-
cords of the parish where the spouse is domiciled and, in the
case of immovable property, where the immovable is situated."2
Sections 2838 and 2839 each contain a change of particular note
to real estate attorneys: comment (d) to section 2838 provides,
in effect, that neither spouse is barred from presenting evi-
dence of the separate character of property because of failure
to include a statement in the acquisition that the property is
being purchased with separate funds for the purchasing
spouse's separate estate. Section 2839(2) states in effect that
the declaration in the acquisition that the things are acquired
with the separate assets of the acquiring spouse may be con-
32. The provision with respect to the filing of the act differs from the present law,
which requires that the act be duly recorded only in the conveyance records of the
parish where the community is domiciled.
[Vol. 39
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troverted by the other spouse or by their creditors, but without
prejudice to the rights of third persons. 33
New Freedom of Spouses to Contract with Each Other
Corollary sections to the Matrimonial Regime Law dealing
with capacity of spouses to contract with each other are sec-
tions 3 and 5 of the Act. Section 5 repeals Civil Code articles
17513' and 2446,31 and section 3 amends Civil Code article 17903
33. LA. R.S. 9:2839(2) (Supp. 1978). This legislative pronouncement runs con-
trary to the present jurisprudential stance that the husband, as distinguished from the
wife, is prevented from offering evidence of the separate character of property that he
acquired during marriage if he failed to include a double declaration in the act of
acquisition. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2402 and 2334. See also Smith v. Smith, 230 La. 509,
89 So. 2d 55 (1956); Phillips v. Nereaux, 357 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978). This
section also affects the jurisprudence with respect to property acquired by the wife
during the marriage even with an inclusion of the separate property declaration. Such
property is still presumed to be community property and a subsequent sale would
require signature of both the husband and wife. See Johnson v. Johnson, 213 La. 1092,
36 So. 2d 396 (1948), wherein the court held that where a wife during the marriage,
although living separate and apart from the husband, purchased property in her name
with a recitation of the paraphernality of funds, the property purchased was still
presumed to be community property and a prospective purchaser was justified in
refusing to accept title from the wife without her husband's signature. Section 2839(2)
will certainly benefit those who find it inconvenient to have the husband join in the
subsequent sale of property acquired by the wife with separate funds, although until
this section has been interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court it may well be the
practice to continue to require both husband and wife to sign all transactions involving
immovable property whether it be separate or community, except those where the
property is clearly separate.
34. "Married persons cannot, during marriage, make to each other, by an act,
either inter vivos or mortis causa, any mutual or reciprocal donation by one and the
same act." LA. Civ. CODE art. 1751.
35. "A contract of sale, between husband and wife, can take place only in the
three following cases:
1. When one of the spouses makes a transfer of property to the other, who is
judicially separated from him or her, in payment of his or her rights.
2. When the transfer made by the husband to his wife, even though not sepa-
rated, has a legitimate cause, as the replacing of her dotal or other effects
alienated.
3. When the wife makes a transfer of property to her husband, in payment of a
sum promised to him as a dowry.
Saving, in these three cases, to the heirs of the contracting parties, their rights, if there
exist any indirect advantage." LA. Civ. CODE art. 2446.
Does the repeal of Louisiana Civil Code articles 1751 and 2446 remove all incapaci-
ties to contract? There might still be a question as to the contractual ability of the
spouses to waive the obligation to provide alimony or child support. An agreement
waiving alimony and child support made after legal separation but before divorce does
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to delete reference to incapacity of husband and wife and arti-
cle 179111 to remove the incapacity of married women. These
provisions are significant, when read in context with the other
sections of the new act, particularly since no mention is made
in the new law itself of the deletions. Previously these repealed
and amended Civil Code articles have been interpreted by the
courts as forbidding any type of real estate sale between
spouses not specifically covered by the three. exceptions in-
cluded in Civil Code article 2446, whether the transfer be di-
rects or indirect.3 Even the sale between a husband and wife
not fall within the exceptions outlined in Civil Code article 2446 and "is a nullity and
can be given no effect." Ward v. Ward, 339 So. 2d 839, 841 (La. 1976). See also Russo
v. Russo, 205 La. 852, 18 So. 2d 318 (1944). However, the court in Nelson v. Walker,
250 La. 545, 197 So. 2d 619 (1967), found that the wife's error in waiving her right to
alimony as part of the consideration for a partition agreement involving a piece of real
property entered into after legal separation was only a "relative nullity." Conse-
quently, nothing prevented the agreement from being ratified and confirmed after her
incapacity ceased, and her title was cured by prescription.
36. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1790, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, will read:
Besides the general incapacity which persons of certain descriptions are under,
there are others applicable only to certain contracts, either in relation to the
parties, such as tutor and ward, whose contracts with each other are forbidden;
or in relation to the subject of the contract, such as purchases, by the adminis-
trator, of any part of the estate which is committed to his charge. These take
place only in the cases specially provided by law, under different titles of this
code.
37. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1791, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, will read:
"The persons who have treated with a minor, person interdicted or of insane mind,
cannot plead the nullity of the agreement, if it is sought to be enforced by the party,
when the disability shall cease, or by those who legally administer the rights of such
person during the disability."
38. In Miller v. Miller, 234 La. 883, 102 So. 2d 52 (1958), the court held that a
purported dation en paiement by the husband to the wife which did "not comply with
the stringent principles governing contracts between husband and wife..." was null
and void. Id. at 899, 102 So. 2d at 57. See also Smith v. Smith, 239 La. 688, 119 So.
2d 827 (1960).
39. Vicknair v. Trosclair, 45 La. Ann. 373, 12 So. 486 (1893). In Douglas v.
Douglas, 51 La. Ann. 1455, 26 So. 54 (1899), a married woman conveyed real estate
to a third person who conveyed to her husband by deeds dated the same day, before
the same notary and witnesses, in the same handwriting, and recorded the same day.
The court held that this must be viewed as one transaction, the object of which was
to divest the title of the wife, and vest it in her husband, and therefore the transaction
was a fraudulent simulation. However, in Bordelon v. S. Gumbel & Co., 118 La. 645,
43 So. 264 (1907), the wife, for the purpose of enabling her husband to borrow money,
made a fictitious sale of her property to the proposed lender for cash, and the latter,
by a separate act, passed and recorded on the same day and before the same notary
and witnesses, sold the property on credit to her husband. The act by which the
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after judicial separation has been questioned unless it is clearly
shown in the act that the sale was made to accomplish a com-
munity property settlement."° The new provisions permitting
unlimited changes in the marriage contract, coupled with the
removal of the prohibitions contained in the Civil Code, ex-
pand the freedom of spouses to contract with each other beyond
the establishing, modifying, or terminating of the matrimonial
regime.4 However, there may be a void left in the Civil Code
with the removal of these prohibitions relating to interspousal
contracts. Consequently it may now be possible under the pro-
visions of the new law for one spouse to sell to the other or grant
to the other an option, a right of first refusal, a lease, or some
other right relating to immovable property, all without ques-
tion. It could be argued that, just as a sale which on its face
shows it is from parent to child is presumed to be a simulated
donation and therefore subject to attack by the forced heirs and
creditors of the donor, likewise a sale from husband to wife,
although technically permitted, would constitute notice to
third parties that this is possibly a simulated sale.4"
husband thus acquired did not recite, or otherwise show on its face, that the property
had been acquired from the wife. Ten years later, after living on and improving the
property which had been assessed in the husband's name, a second mortgage was
placed on the property. In choosing between the rights of the wife and the second
mortgagee the court held for the mortgagee, distinguishing Vicknair v. Trosclair and
Douglas v. Douglas on the basis that "in [those cases] the creditor had not parted
with his money on the faith of the public records, and without notice of the rights of
the wife, as in this case." 118 La. at 647, 43 So. 2d at 265. See also First Nat'l Bank v.
Garlick, 137 La. 282, 68 So. 610 (1914), wherein the court upheld a similar transaction,
distinguishing Vicknair v. Trosclair and Douglas v. Douglas and stating that the two
sales involved "were not made on the same day, or before the same notary and wit-
nesses, but some four years apart, and before another notary and other witnesses, and
were on their face absolute." 137 La. at 287, 68 So. at 612.
40. In Love v. Dedon, 239 La. 109, 118 So. 2d 122 (1960), the former wife filed
suit against the former husband to rescind and set aside two deeds whereby each had
transferred to the other interests in land and a house on the basis that the properties
were acquired during their marriage and that, although judicially separated, they were
still legally married at the time of execution of the acts of sale and thus such acts were
illegal and void. Parol evidence was admissible to establish that the motive or real
consideration in executing the two deeds was to effect a settlement of the community
previously existing between the parties. Both deeds were upheld.
41. See notes 34, 35, 36 and 37, supra.
42. An action to annul a simulated contract under Louisiana Civil Code article
2239 is imprescriptible, Succession of Webre, 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965), and
forced heirs have an absolute right to attack simulated obligations made by their
parents. A "simulated sale" results when parties utilize the form of a sale, but no price
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Dissolution and Reestablishment of the Community
The matrimonial regime, whether it be the regime estab-
lished by contract or the legal regime existing by operation of
law, will be dissolved by the death of one of the spouses, by a
judgment of divorce or separation from bed and board, by a
judgment decreeing the separation of property, or by contract
of the spouses."3 The Matrimonial Regime Law, however, liter-
ally provides for dissolution only by a judgment substituting
the separation of property for the existing regime, which judg-
ment is "retroactive to the day of the filing of the petition,""
a provision not inconsistent with present law. 5 There should be
little question, however, that if dissolved by death, the regime
is dissolved as of the moment of death," or, if dissolved by
contract, at the date of the dissolving contract. The dissolution
by contract, however, would not be effective against third par-
ties until filed for registry in the mortgage records of the parish
where the spouses are domiciled, and in relation to immova-
bles, until filed for registry in the mortgage records of the par-
ish where the immovable is situated." The date that the com-
munity regime is dissolved in a suit for separation from bed and
board, or in a suit for divorce, a subject of considerable litiga-
tion in the past,'8 will still be covered, respectively, by Civil
is, or is intended to be, given. Where actual consideration, no matter how small, has
been paid by the purchaser, the transaction is not a "simulated sale." Succession of
Nelson, 224 La. 731, 70 So. 2d 665 (1954). Parol evidence is admissible for the purpose
of invalidating an authentic act where there are allegations of fraud in the making of
the contract and for the purpose of proving a simulated transfer of property. LA. Civ.
CODE arts. 2236, 2239, 2444, 2480.
43. LA. R.S. 9:2848 (Supp. 1978).
44. LA. R.S. 9:2856 (Supp. 1978).
45. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2432.
46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2876(3). See Succession of Hollier, 158 So. 2d 351 (La. App.
3d Cir.), rev'd and remanded, 247 La. 384, 171 So. 2d 656 (1964). By contrast, in the
case of bank deposits and collections, LA. R.S. 10:4-405 (Supp. 1974) provides that the
death of a customer does not revoke authority previously given until the bank knows
of the fact of death and has reasonable opportunity to act on it.
47. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978).
48. The Louisiana Supreme Court in 1918 held that the judgment of separation
"from bed and board retroacted to the date of filing of that suit . . . ." Gastauer v.
Gastauer, 143 La. 749, 753, 79 So. 326, 328 (1918) (emphasis added). Years later, in
Tanner v. Tanner, 229 La. 399, 86 So. 2d 80 (1956), it concluded that "the court
committed inadvertent error in such pronouncement and that it meant to say and
hold: 'The judgment in the suit for separation of property retroacted to the date of the
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Code articles 155 and 159,'1 which provide that each judgment
carries with it the dissolution of the community retroactive to
the date on which the original petition in the action was filed.
With respect to the reestablishment of the community
after dissolution, it is questionable, in view of the freedom of
contract provisions of the new law, whether the requirements
in Civil Code article 155 will continue to be applicable. Under
Civil Code article 155 the reestablishment of the community
(which must be recorded in the conveyance records of the par-
ish where the parties are domiciled) is limited to a reestablish-
ment of the community as it previously existed without any
new provisions or modifications being made." Under the new
filing of that suit .... '" 229 La. at 415, 86 So. 2d at 85 (emphasis in original).
Therefore the judgment of divorce or separation from bed and board was not effective
until judgment. In 1962, article 155 was amended by the legislature to specifically
make the judgment for separation from bed and board "retroactive to the date on
which the petition for same was filed," without mentioning divorce. LA. CiV. CODE art.
155. In the case of Malone v. Malone, 260 La. 759, 257 So. 2d 397 (1972), the court in
dicta interpreted the effect of article 155 as legislatively restoring the interpretation of
the pre-Tanner jurisprudence that in a suit for divorce as well as for separation, the
community is dissolved retroactively as of the date of filing of the petition.
49. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 155 and 159, as amended by 1977 La. Acts, No. 483.
Article 159 limits the retroactive dissolution of the community of acquets or gains to
those cases where the community of acquets or gains exists on the date of filing the
original petition of separation from bed and board, Foster v. Foster, 246 So. 2d 70 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 258 La. 774, 247 So. 2d 867 (1971), or divorce, Malone v.
Malone, 260 La. 759, 257 So. 2d 397 (1972). Article 155 specifically provides for the
retroactive dissolution of the community of acquets or gains in those cases where the
community of acquets or gains exists on the date of the filing of the original action for
separation from bed and board. See note 50, infra. Upon the filing of a suit for separa-
tion from bed and board or divorce it is not required, but often customary, for the
plaintiff to obtain a temporary restraining order which must be recorded in the convey-
ance records; in order to afford notice to third parties of the dissolution of the com-
munity, however, one must file a lis pendens in the mortgage records of the parish
where the property to be affected is situated. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 3604, 3751, 3752.
50. LA. CiV. CODE art. 155 provides for the retroactive dissolution of the com-
munity of acquets or gains to the date of filing the petition for separation from bed
and board. In addition it provides for the reestablishment of the community of acquets
or gains retroactive to the date of filing the petition for the separation from bed and
board, but only if the spouses jointly execute the reestablishing act before a notary and
two witnesses and record the act in the conveyance records of the parish where the
spouses are domiciled. This principle of reestablishment was tested in Austin v. Suc-
cession of Austin, 225 La. 449, 73 So. 2d 312 (1954), wherein the spouses reconciled
shortly after the judgment of separation from bed and board but failed to execute the
reestablishing act in accordance with article 155. The court found that there was no
community regime, and upon the husband's death in 1951 the wife had no claim to
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law,51 however, the spouses may contract (which contract is to
be recorded in the mortgage records, not only of the parish
where the parties are domiciled but also where the immovable
property is located) at any time or times and may make as
many modifications as they wish as long as they do not re-
nounce or alter the marital portion or the established order
of succession, or prohibit gratuitous dispositions permitted by
law. 51
The removal of the prohibition against post-nuptial modi-
fication of the marriage contract and the repeal of the codal
limitations on the legal capacity of spouses to contract with
each other establish a freedom not heretofore experienced by
married persons domiciled in Louisiana or owning immovable
property in Louisiana. The greatest impact the new law will
have on real estate practice in Louisiana probably will come
not so much from new requirements in the law as from this new
freedom to contract. As the contractual regime with all its
possible variations becomes better known, there could develop
a community property system in Louisiana wherein a uni-
formly structured legal regime, experienced under the present
any of the property acquired by the husband since their reconciliation. The reconcilia-
tion of the spouses extinguishes every effect of judicial separation from bed and board
except the dissolution of community of acquets or gains.
Article 155 also provides that the reestablishment of the community shall be
without prejudice to the rights validly acquired in the interim between rendition of the
judgment and recordation of the act of reconciliation. This section should be construed
as referring to the rights of third parties, not the rights of the spouses, but Corkern v.
Corkern, 270 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), application withdrawn, 272 So. 2d
372 (La. 1973), indicates that spouses may in effect reestablish the community as of
the date of the reestablishing act rather than the date of filing of the suit for separation
from bed and board. The reestablishing act in Corkern stated it reestablished the
community as of the date of the filing of suit for separation, but then proceeded to
except from its provisions all assets acquired by each spouse between that date and
the date of the reestablishing act. Professor Pascal submits that the Corkern decision
is wrong, because the parties had not followed the dictates of article 155, and because
tolerating any other type of reestablishing act would be against public order; the rule
of article 155 is not subject to being contracted against by the parties. The Work of
the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 34 LA.
L. REV. 255 (1973).
51. See text at notes 28, 29, and 30, supra.
52. See text at notes 28, 29, and 30, supra. Perhaps the most important aspect
of the change in the law with respect to the legal capacity of spouses to contract with
each other is that this ability may extend to matters beyond matrimonial regime
concerns and may bind third parties with recordation only in the mortgage records.
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law, becomes more the exception than the rule for parties in-
vesting in real estate.
NATURE OF EACH SPOUSE'S OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN THE
COMMUNITY OF GAINS
The nature of each spouse's ownership interest in the com-
munity of gains, a subject of no little controversy in the past,
is defined in section 2838. Five words should be brought sharply
into focus: "Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half
interest in the community property."
"Each" Spouse
The use of the word "each" denotes not merely equality,
but, in this context, an equality in ownership. The word
"each," as an adjective, is defined as "[b]eing one of two or
more individuals that together form an aggregate, 5 3 or as
"[e]very one of two or more considered or treated distinctly
from the rest,"u and also as "[o]ne of two or more persons,
objects, or things considered individually or one by one." 55 It
would appear, therefore, that the connotation intended for the
first two words of this section, read in context, is: "Each
spouse, considered individually and distinctly from the other,
one by one, owns. ...."
"Owns"
The Civil Code provides that one who owns immovable
property in Louisiana has a right by which a thing belongs to
him in particular, to the exclusion of all other persons, 5 and
this ownership right is vested in him who has the immediate
dominion of the thing, and not in him who has a mere benefici-
ary right in it.57 This right of ownership is entirely distinct from
the right of possession, for the right of ownership exists inde-
pendently of the exercise of it, although the owner exposes
53. BRrrrANICA WORLD LANGUAGE (1956).
54. WENSTER'S 20Tm CENTURY DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1964). See also BALLANTINE'S
LAw DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969).
55. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (1973).
56. LA. CIv. CODE art. 488.
57. LA. CIv. CODE art. 489.
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himself to the loss of his right of ownership in a thing if he
permits it to remain in the possession of a third person in a
manner and for a time sufficient to enable the latter to acquire
it by prescription." The Civil Code further provides that there
are three different degrees of the right to a thing: (1) a full and
entire ownership, (2) the mere use and enjoyment, or (3) a
servitude due upon an immovable estate." The full and entire
ownership is in turn divided into two classifications: perfect
ownership, which is perpetual and unencumbered by any right
toward any person other than the owner; and imperfect owner-
ship, which terminates at a certain time or on a condition or
involves the charge of any real right on the immovable toward
a third person, such as usufruct, use, or servitude. 0 This Civil
Code term "perfect ownership," as defined by the Louisiana
Supreme Court," means the right to use, enjoy, and dispose of
property to the exclusion of others, and consists of three ele-
ments united in the same person: "usus" or right to use,
"fructus" or right to the fruits, and "abusus" or right to dis-
pose. In the new Matrimonial Regime Law, however, the type
of ownership each spouse has in community property is not
described as "full and entire ownership," "perfect ownership,"
or "imperfect ownership," nor is the ownership right described
as being "vested in" each spouse. The legislature did not
choose simply to provide that "each spouse owns an undivided
one-half interest" in the community property but instead chose
to define this ownership interest of each spouse as a present
one. Conceivably, this section of the new law would have the
same legal significance without the use of the word "present,"
particularly since the words "each spouse owns" render this
section equally applicable to husband and wife. One might ask
whether the use of the word "present" was the result of political
or sociological considerations, 2 or whether the word was in-
58. LA. Civ. CODE art. 496.
59. LA. CIv. CODE art. 487.
60. LA. Civ. CODE art. 490.
61. Giroir v. Dumesnil, 248 La. 1037, 184 So. 2d 1 (1966).
62. The new Matrimonial Regime Law is perhaps evidence that the law is never
static-it is ever changing to reflect the different sociological, political, and economic
needs of society. This resiliency or changing quality, while often vigorously resisted, is
necessary for the continued viability of the law. In writing about Mr. Justice Holmes
and the Constitution, Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter observed that "[tihe eternal
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tended to perform a legal function in modifying the type of
interest owned by each spouse. 3
A "Present" Interest
A brief review of the historical development of the defini-
tion of the wife's present ownership interest during the com-
munity indicates that the use of the word "present" to describe
this interest is not new. According to modern legal scholars,
French and Spanish authorities originally characterized the
nature of the wife's ownership interest during the community
in various ways-as a mere expectancy, a benefit of survivor-
ship, a hope, or as being revocable and constructive in nature.
Over the years this characterization developed toward a co-
ownership theory, but with no definite conclusion as to the
origin of this theory." Due to the relatively recent discovery in
New Orleans of redactor Moreau Lislet's manuscript source
notes of the Louisiana Digest of 1808, there is little question but
that the Louisiana community property system is almost en-
tirely Spanish in origin and nature, rather than French." Ac-
cordingly, Nina Pugh points out that the Spanish wife, equally
with her husband, had dominio (ownership interest and posses-
sion) of the bienes gananciales (ganancial assets) but she did
not tiene (hold) them: "The husband, who was said 'to have
and to hold' the gananciales, was empowered to act in regard
struggle in the law between constancy and change is largely a struggle between history
and reason, between past reason and present needs." F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE
HOLMES AND THE CONsTIrTrrION 40 (1927).
63. For an interesting review of some of the deliberation by the Council of the
Louisiana State Law Institute prior to the drafting of the new Matrimonial Regime
Law, see Riley, Women's Rights in the Louisiana Matrimonial Regime, 50 TUL. L. REV.
557 (1976), wherein that writer, the Law Institute's reporter, suggests that "[uJnder
the legal regime, each spouse shall be declared in the Code to have full ownership
of an undivided one-half interest in each asset of the community." Id. at 574 (emphasis
added).
64. The late Professor Daggett stated in Daggett, The Modern Problem of the
Nature of the Wife's Interest in Community Property-A Comparative Study, 19
CALIF. L. REV. 467 (1931), that "[i]n this maze of ancient statutes and learned an-
notations, anything and nothing may be proved about as elusive a thing as the wife's
interest in the community." Id. at 571. See also Pugh, The Spanish Community of
Gains in 1803: 'Sociedad de Gananciales,'30 LA. L. REV. 1 (1969); Roundtree, Nature
of the Wife's Interest During the Existence of the Community, 25 LA. L. REV. 159
(1964).
65. Pugh, supra note 64, at 1-2 n.1.
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to them. He was described as in actu (in control) as well as in
habitu et in creditu (in present interest as creditor) in regard
to the bienes gananciales, but no less a co-owner."" Similarly,
Professor Bartke concludes, "Scholars now uniformly agree
that at least as early as the 18th Century the Spanish wife had
a present, existing property interest in the community, rather
than an expectancy."67 Thus, the late Professor Morrow in
1959 declared that, as a result of Spanish influence, "the wife
in Louisiana, has, just as the husband has, an immediate,
present one-half interest, as owner, in all community property
from the time of its acquisition.""
A corollary to this development of the use of the word
present to describe the wife's ownership interest in the com-
munity property has been the evolution, beginning in the
1920's, of the federal income tax laws." Under tax law passed
in 1926,70 if the wife was declared to own a present vested inter-
est in community property, she would be able to declare in her
separate tax return one-half of the annual community income;
otherwise all of it would have to be reported on her husband's
return, resulting in a larger tax burden.7 The United States
Supreme Court in 1930, when confronted with this issue in the
Louisiana test case of Bender v. Pfaff,72 determined that
66. Id. at 12. Bienes gananciales means ganancial assets. See BOUVIER'S LAW
DIcroNARY 460 (1934), for a definition of ganancial as property "held in community,"
and L. ROBB, DICTONARY OF LEGAL TERMS (3d ed. 1966), translating bienes gananciales
as "property of a couple acquired after marriage, community property."
67. Bartke, Community Property Law Reform in the United States and in Can-
ada-A Comparison and Critique, 50 TUL. L. REV. 213, 218 (1976) (emphasis added).
68. Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REv. 3, 17-18
(1960) (emphasis added). It is of interest also to note that there are other community
property systems in which the wife's interest has been described as a "present" one.
Bartke, supra, note 67 at 219-21. Texas, California, and New Mexico law couch the
wife's interest in terms more of expectancy than of ownership. The remaining four
community property states (Nevada, Idaho, Arizona, and Washington) characterize
the wife's interest as a present interest.
69. See LeBlanc, "Vardell's Estate v. Commissioner" and "United States v.
Stapf": Estate Tax Windfalls for Community Property Taxpayers? 37 TUL. L. REv. 297
(1962); Walther and Wittmann, Separation and Divorce in Louisiana: A Tax Analysis,
37 TUL. L. Rav. 1 (1962).
70. Pub. L. No. 69-20, 44 Stat. 9, 130 (1926).
71. For a good review of how tax problems became the cause for change in our
community property law, see Roundtree Nature of the Wife's Interest During the
Existence of the Community, 25 LA. L. Rzv. 159, 173-74 (1964).
72. 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
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"[ilnasmuch, therefore, as in Louisiana, the wife has a present
vested interest in community property equal to that of her
husband, we hold that the spouses are entitled to file separate
returns . . . ."" In Poe v. Seaborn,4 another case decided in
the same year, the Court found that "[tihe law's investiture
of the husband with broad powers, by no means negatives the
wife's present interest as a co-owner.' 75
Legislative Evolution of "Present"
While commentators have been quick to categorize the
wife's interest in the community of gains, the Louisiana Civil
Code did not provide a definition of that interest until the
amendment of article 2398 in 1976. Among the present articles
of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing with community property
and the wife's interest therein during the existence of the mar-
riage are article 2399 providing that marriage is a partnership
or community of acquets or gains, if there is no contract to the
contrary;" article 2404 providing that the husband is the head
and master of that partnership or community of gains, admin-
istering all its effects; 77 article 2406 providing in part that the
effects composing the partnership or community of gains are to
be divided into two equal parts upon the dissolution of the
marriage; 7 and article 2410 providing that the wife may exon-
erate herself from debts contracted during the marriage by
renouncing the partnership or community of gains .7 Although
the liberal use of the word partnership connotes a concept of a
vested ownership interest as partner, there is no specific lan-
guage defining the nature of the wife's interest in community
property in these articles; therefore, the repealing of these arti-
cles, coupled with the unequivocal language of section 2838,
underscores the significance of the use of the word "present"
to describe the wife's ownership interest.
73. Id. at 132 (emphasis added).
74. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
75. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
76. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2399.
77. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404.
78. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2406.
79. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2410.
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This legislative recognition in Louisiana of the wife's
present ownership interest during the community evolved
gradually from a "no sort of right" in the Digest of 1808; s1 an
absence of any clear definition, but a restriction on the hus-
band's right to convey community property by gratuitous title,
in 1825;8' and a minor word change in 1870;1 to the definition
of "present, undivided one-half share" in 197611 and "present
undivided one-half interest" in Act 627 of 1978. Yet categoriza-
tion of this interest by the Louisiana Supreme Court during
this same period vacillated.
Jurisprudential Evolution of "Present"
In the 1830's it was held that the right of the wife to the
one-half was a "legal right" and could be enforced when the
marriage was dissolved or the community ceased;84 but in the
1840's and 1850's the court changed its mind and concluded
that Louisiana's laws had "never recognized a title in the wife
during marriage," 5 and then held that the wife had only an
80. LA. DIGEST of 1808 art. 66. The pertinent provision in the 1808 Digest pro-
vided:
The husband is head and master of the partnership or community of gains; he
administers said effects; disposes of the revenues which they produce and may
sell or even give away same without the consent and permission of his wife,
because she has no sort of right in them until her husband be dead.
(Emphasis added.)
81. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2373 (1825). The 1825 Code omitted the last portion of the
first paragraph found in the corresponding article in the 1808 Digest (see italicized
language in note 80, supra) and rewrote the alienation provision thusly: "and may
alienate them by an encumbered title, without the consent and permission of his wife."
82. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2404. The Civil Code of 1870 changed the word
"encumbered" in article 2404 to the word "onerous" so that the alienation portion
read: "and may alienate them by an onerous title, without the consent and permission
of his wife."
83. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2398.
84. Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 188, 194 (1832). The court also stated that
while "admitting that the wife's title to the property did not vest, until the community
was dissolved, still her right to have an equal portion of such property acquired during
coverture, as might be found at its dissolution, existed." Id. at 192.
85. Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226, 227 (1847). The court stated the rule of
the Spanish law to be that the husband is, during marriage, "real y verdadero duefio
de todos, y tiene en el efecto de su dominio irrevocable"-the husband is, during
marriage, the true and veritable owner of all, and he himself holds irrevocable dominio
over all. Id. at 228 (emphasis added) (writer's trans.). The court cited the commentator
Febrero to the effect that the ownership of the wife under the Spanish law, from which
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"eventual interest." 6 The trend reversed itself in the 1920's
when the court held that the wife's interest during marriage
was "not a mere expectancy," and that title for half of the
community property was "vested in the wife the moment it
[was] acquired by the community" in "absolute ownership,
subject to the husband's power of administration. '87 Accord-
ingly, in the 1940's, in the often cited case of Succession of
Wiener,M the court held the community to be "a partnership"
in which the husband and wife owned equal shares, "their title
thereto vesting at the very instant such property [was] ac-
quired. 8 9 This judicial attitude continued in the 1950's with
the holding that a stock transfer in a company charter could
not "negative the wife's present interest as co-owner"; 0 and in
provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code on the same subject were taken, is revocable
and fictitious during marriage.
86. Davis v. Compton, 13 La. Ann. 396 (1858).
87. Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 825-26, 107 So. 584, 588 (1926) (emphasis
added).
88. 203 La. 649, 14 So. 2d 475 (1943).
89. Id. at 657, 14 So. 2d at 477. Succession of Wiener held unconstitutional a
portion of the Revenue Act of 1942, thus finding that the payment of estate taxes was
due only on the decedent's share of the community and not, as the tax collector had
alleged, on the entire community. The court not only found that the community was
a partnership but also that the wife was "the half-partner and owner of all acquisitions
made during the existence of the community, whether they [were] property or in-
come," and that the husband, being the head of the partnership, "did not in any way
affect the status of the property or the wife's ownership of her half thereof." Id. at 666-
67, 14 So. 2d at 480-81. This partnership theory was emphasized by the following
language at the conclusion of the opinion:
It is obvious, therefore, that the wife's interest in the community property in
Louisiana does not spring from any fiction of the law or from any gift or act of
generosity on the part of her husband but, instead, from an express legal con-
tract of partnership entered into at the time of the marriage. There is no sub-
stantial difference between her interest therein and the interest of an ordinary
member of a limited or ordinary partnership, the control and management of
whose affairs has, by agreement, been entrusted to a managing partner.
Id. at 669, 14 So. 2d at 481-82. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the tone of
Wiener without citing authority in Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La.
1973), but just three years later, in T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d
834 (La. 1976), the court nevertheless cited Wiener with approval.
90. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 508, 86 So. 2d 169, 173 (1956)
(emphasis added). The husband in a community settlement dispute with his former
wife had alleged, unsuccessfully, that shares of common stock in the company em-
ploying him should not be divided in kind, but that he should be allowed to retain all
of the stock and instead merely pay one-half of its book value and assets because of
provisions in the company charter.
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1968 when the court in United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Green' followed Wiener in holding that "the wife's rights
in and to the community property [did] not rest upon the
mere gratuity of her husband; they [were] just as great as his
and [were] entitled to equal dignity."'" In 1973, however, the
trend reversed again when the landmark case of Creech v. Cap-
itol Mack, Inc.'3 held that since the wife was given options at
the dissolution of the marriage in regard to claiming or re-
nouncing her one-half interest in the community of acquets and
gains, her interest was only "imperfect ownership" not becom-
ing perfect ownership until dissolution of the community. 4 In
1976, however, Creech's reasoning was repudiated when the
supreme court held, in a later case, that the wife's one-half
interest was "at all times real, vesting in her the right to dis-
pose of her interest by will and giving her the right to demand
her one-half interest upon dissolution of the marriage . . .,.
91. 252 La. 227, 210 So. 2d 328 (1968).
92. Id. at 233, 210 So. 2d at 330. In disallowing the collection of an antenuptial
debt of the husband by garnishing the joint account of the community as well as the
salary of the wife, it was held that the wife did have an ownership interest in the
community, The court found that prior decisions giving the wife a mere expectancy or
residuary interest were incorrect because they were based "on a wrong translation of
the Spanish word dominio used by the commentator Febrero as meaning dominion or
control instead of ownership in describing the authority of the husband over the com-
munity estate." See text at note 66, supra. This decision protected the fruits of the
wife's labors from the husband's prenuptial creditors and was rendered to secure the
wife's vested interest in the community.
93. 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973).
94. Id. at 509. According to the reasoning of the Green case which Creech specifi-
cally overruled, the facts in Creech presented a distinction without a difference. Creech
involved the wife of a first marriage who sought the court's assistance in collecting a
debt arising out of the community property settlement of the first marriage and in
enforcing a judgment against her former husband by seizing his assets in the second
community. The court, citing Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226 (1847), allowed
seizure of the entire community property (not merely the husband's interest therein),
subject only to an accounting by the husband (upon dissolution of the second com-
munity) for the enrichment of his separate estate through the discharge of antenuptial
debts. The court's decision was authored by Justice Barham with a strong dissent by
Justice Summers, who felt that the Green case should not be overruled.
95. T.L. James & Co., Inc. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 844 (La. 1976). The
facts of this case are not dissimilar from those in Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La.
495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956), except that here the employer of the deceased husband
provoked concursus proceedings against the widow and heirs of the employee to deter-
mine if the employee retirement and profit-sharing plans and group insurance plans
with a named beneficiary were payable at death to the beneficiary free of any claims
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Legislature vs. Creech, a Reaction to "Present"
Both the 1973 Louisiana Supreme Court decision in
Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc. and the 1976 legislative defini-
tion of the wife's interest as "present"' 6 had a direct impact on
the language used in section 2838 of the new act and, therefore,
deserve closer scrutiny. In Creech the Louisiana Supreme
Court confronted the issue of whether the wife was in fact
vested with an ownership interest in community property,
thereby precluding the seizure of community assets to satisfy
the antenuptial debts of the husband due his first wife. The
court cited the 1847 case of Guice v. Lawrence,7 quoting with
approval that court's discussion of early Spanish law as ex-
plained by Febrero:
The ownership of the wife . . . is revocable and fictitious
during marriage. As long as the husband lives and the
marriage is not dissolved, the wife must not say that she
has gananciales, nor is she to prevent the husband from
using them, under the pretext that the law gives her one-
half. 8
The court also commented,
by the widow and forced heirs. The principal issue was whether proceeds of a profit-
sharing and retirement plan are earned income of the husband and constitute com-
munity acquets or gains, therefore entitling the widow to one-half of the proceeds
which vested subsequent to her marriage to the employee. The court interpreted Civil
Code article 2334 to mean that the wife is not vested only with ownership of one-half
of the community, but is likewise owner of half of community income. It held, in its
rehearing opinion written by Justice Summers, that, unlike life insurance contracts,
the contractual agreement for the retirement and profit-sharing plans could not preju-
dice the rights of forced heirs or the community ownership of the spouses. Riley, supra
note 63, at 569 n.59. As authority for its statement the court cited Bender v. Pfaff, 282
U.S. 127 (1930); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229
La. 495, 86 So. 2d 196 (1956); and Succession of Wiener, 203 La. 649, 14 So. 2d 475
(1943); but strangely enough did not mention the 1973 decision in Creech v. Capitol
Mack, Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La: 1973).
96. LA. CIv. CoDe art. 2398. Article 2398 after its amendment by 1976 La. Acts,
No. 444, § 1 reads: "Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half share in the
community property subject to the management of the community by the husband in
accordance with the rights and restrictions provided by law." See also La. H.R. Con.
Res. No. 23, 2d Extra. Sess. (1976), following Act 444.
97. 2 La. Ann. 226 (1847).
98. 287 So. 2d at 501, quoting Guice v. Lawrence, 2 La. Ann. 226, 228 (1847).
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Febrero says the wife has dominion, but Febrero also says
that the wife does not have the use of the community or
even of her one-half interest. The wife does have domin-
ion, but since use and control are necessary ingredients to
perfect ownership, that dominion or ownership which the
wife has falls short of perfect ownership."
The court then held that the entire community interest in a
house and lot belonging to the second community could be
seized in satisfaction of the debt incurred by the husband to
his first wife prior to the second marriage, subject to an ac-
counting by the husband upon the dissolution of the second
community for the enrichment of his separate estate through
the discharge of antenuptial debts. ' 0 It concluded that "the
wife's interest in the community [was] imperfect ownership
without use."'0'
The 1976 legislature reacted to this decision by providing
in Louisiana Civil Code article 2398 that "[e]ach spouse owns
a present undivided one-half share in the community property
subject to the management of the community by the husband
... , 102 In addition, a few months later, the legislature passed
a concurrent resolution in the second extraordinary session,
clarifying the legislative intent. Although the resolution quoted
in full the request of the Louisiana Law Institute that the legis-
lature "reaffirm the pre-Creech view that each spouse' has a
vested interest in each asset of the community,' '0 3 it neverthe-
less did not adopt the requested language but instead simply
stated that "the sole purpose of adopting Article 2398 was to
preclude possible adverse Federal estate tax consequences and
in no manner to restrict the authority of the husband relative
to management, control or administration of community prop-
erty." 04 Thus, the 1976 legislature concluded not that each
99. 287 So. 2d at 508 (emphasis in original).
100. Id. at 510. The court noted that "in both France and Spain the law has
evolved to expressly provide for satisfaction of antenuptial debts out of the com-
munity's property." Id. at 509.
101. Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
102. Emphasis added. For the text of LA. CIv. CODE art. 2398, see note 96, supra.
103. La. H.R. Con. Res. No. 23, 2d Extra. Sess. (1976).
104. Id. House Concurrent Resolution No. 23 was published with article 2398.
This concurrent resolution was in direct response to the characterization of the wife's
interest in Creech.
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spouse has a vested interest but that each spouse owns a pres-
ent undivided share.' 5 In 1978 this "present . share" word-
ing in Louisiana Civil Code article 2398 was utilized in section
2838 of the new law to read, "present. . . interest." Although
the comment to section 2838 states, "[t]his provision repro-
duces in substance Article 2398 . . . ,"10 it neglects to mention
the concurrent resolution that followed article 2398 or the
change of the word "share" to the word "interest."
The use of the word "present," therefore, to describe the
ownership interest of each spouse in community property ap-
pears to follow, if not the explicit terminology of the Louisiana
Civil Code itself, then at least the trend of the evolution of the
Code. This word has been used by legal scholars' 7 and legisla-
tures in several other community property states,'8 and the
primary purpose for using it may have been to contrast, for tax
purposes, the wife's presently vested undivided interest during
the existence of the community with the interest recognized at
the termination of the community.
"Undivided" One-Half "Interest" in the Community Property
The word undivided was employed by the legislature both
in the 1976 amendment to article 2398 as "undivided share"
and in new section 2838 as "undivided interest," thus indicat-
ing a legislative intent to create an ownership in common. 0
105. The use of the word "present" in article 2398 seems to have evolved, not
from the terminology of our Civil Code or from definitions laid down by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, but from a need to contrast, for tax purposes, the wife's presently
vested interest with a future interest that one might acquire, for example, by inheri-
tance. Therefore, this word usage by the legislature in 1976, being in direct response
to the characterization of the wife's interest in Creech, could be interpreted liberally
as a presently vested interest.
106. Of special interest is the provision in section 10 of Act 627: "The source
notes, comments, and special notes contained in this chapter reflect the intent of the
Legislature."
Although the change from "share" to "interest" could be viewed as a substantive
change, the legislative intent in new section 2838 to reproduce the substance of article
2398 without the limitations of House Concurrent Resolution No. 23 seems evident.
107. See text at notes 67 and 68, supra.
108. See note 68, supra.
109. This co-ownership type of relationship between husband and wife is men-
tioned in comment (b) to section 2838 which provides: "Married persons owning com-
munity property are not treated like other co-owners of property who may force a
partition at will, Louisiana Civil Code article 1289. The spouses are subject to specific
19791
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The Louisiana Civil Code provides that co-owners have an un-
restricted right to use and enjoy immovable property owned in
indivision" ° subject only to the obligation to account to other
co-owners."1 This ownership right of the co-owner is fortified by
the provision that no one can be compelled to hold property
with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon."'
Therefore the co-owner has the right to demand the division of
a thing held in common by the action of partition, and, al-
though the parties may agree that there shall not be a partition
for a certain limited time,"' they nevertheless may not contract
that there shall never be a partition of a thing held in com-
mon."' However, the co-owner's imprescriptible right to parti-
tion"5 is not conferred by the legislature on a husband and wife
co-owning property under the new Matrimonial Regime Law.
Although co-owners owning immovable property together have
perfect vested ownership, with each co-owner having a similar
ownership right to his particular share, the same underlying
rationale is not made applicable to the co-ownership relation-
ship of husband and wife. While both spouses together have
full, complete, perfect, vested ownership of a community im-
movable, neither spouse enjoys in his or her own right the same
ownership of his or her share or interest as is afforded to other
rules governing distribution of community property." LA. R.S. 9:2838, comment (b)
(Supp. 1978). Consequently, the relationship cannot be classified as true co-ownership.
110. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 491 and 494.
111. LA. CIv. CODE art. 494; Juneau v. Laborde, 229 La. 410, 82 So. 2d 693 (1955);
Harper v. O'Neal, 363 So. 2d 930 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
112. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1289 provides: "No one can be compelled to hold property
with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon; any one has a right to demand
the division of a thing held in common, by the action of partition."
113. LA. Ctv. CODE art. 1298; Gallagher v. Gallagher, 339 So. 2d 483 (La. App.
2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 So. 2d 897 (La. 1977). However, a stipulation against parti-
tion is likely to be rejected by the courts if it is too "vague and indefinite." Walker v.
Chapital, 218 La. 663, 50 So. 2d 641 (1951).
114. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1297 provides: "It cannot be stipulated that there never
shall be a partition of a succession or of a thing held in common. Such a stipulation
would be null and of no effect."
115. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1304 provides:
The action of partition can not be prescribed against, as long as the thing
remains in common, and such community is acknowledged or proved.
Thus, though coheirs have enjoyed their hereditary effects in common for an
hundred years and more, without making a division, any of them can, at any
time, sue for a partition.
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co-owners of Louisiana immovable property. This seems to af-
ford only a limited species of co-ownership to each spouse in
community property. If section 2838 were authority for the
statement that each spouse is vested with title, in perfect
ownership, to an undivided interest in community property,
why would there be a limitation on the right to partition or,
for that matter, on the right of one spouse to deal with that
spouse's share of community immovables? The legislature
tried to remove the past restrictions on spouses by giving them
complete freedom to contract"' and by treating them as co-
owners;'" however, the spouses were not vested with the full
rights of co-owners because the comment to section 2838
denies them the right to force a partition at will.""
Defining the exact nature of the ownership interest of each
spouse in the community of gains has been a controversial
subject primarily because of the absence in the law prior to
1976 of specific language defining that interest. The new law
defines that interest. Section 2838 states that each spouse owns
a present undivided one-half interest in the community prop-
erty. It should be noted, however, that despite the use by the
legislature of the words, "each . . .owns . . .present . . .
undivided . . . interest" in section 2838, the nature of the
equal ownership interest of each spouse in the community
immovables appears to be something less than the full or
complete or perfect ownership interest afforded other co-
owners of Louisiana immovable property under our codal
scheme.
MANNER OF ALIENATING OR ENCUMBERING COMMUNITY PROPERTY
"Management," the title of Subpart B of Part II of the
Matrimonial Regime Law, is a term that connotes the vesting
of a power only of administration."' The first section in Sub-
part B is section 2842, entitled "Management of Community
and Separate Property Generally," which provides that
116. LA. R.S. 9:2833 (Supp. 1978).
117. LA. R.S. 9:2838 (Supp. 1978).
118. For the text of comment (b), see note 109, supra.
119. LA. Cw. CODE art. 2996 provides: "A mandate conceived in general terms,
confers only a power of administration."
1979]
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"[ejach spouse acting alone may manage, control, and dispose
of his or her separate property, and except as otherwise pro-
vided by law,120 each spouse, acting alone may manage, control,
and dispose of community property.'' 1  This provision creates
an important conceptual change and perhaps for many is the
most significant aspect of the Matrimonial Regime Law. It sets
the tone for equality in the management of community prop-
erty generally but does not regulate the alienation, encum-
brance or lease of community immovables.
Due to a concern for the well-being of the family, certain
transactions were deemed by the legislature to require concur-
rence. Consequently, for the attorney in real estate practice,
the key section in the entire Matrimonial Regime Law is sec-
tion 2843 entitled "Alienation of Community Property; When
Concurrence of Spouses Required." This section provides in
part for the alienation, encumbrance or lease of community
immovables only upon the concurrence of the spouses. 22 The
legislative comments amplifying section 2843 provide that the
spouse who joins in a transaction becomes a party thereto un-
less personal responsibility is expressly negated.' 23
The concurrence of a spouse can be accomplished through
an appearance in the instrument itself or through use of a
120. LA. R.S. 9:2843-47 (Supp. 1978) set forth the requirements of concurrence
of the spouses for the alienation of community property and the sanctions for unau-
thorized alienation.
121. LA. R.S. 9:2842 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added). This section is evidently
designed to confer on each spouse broad management control over the entire com-
munity interest, the interest of both spouses; however, a general grant of authority to
manage and control property does not normally confer power to dispose of it. LA. Civ.
CODE art. 2996. Perhaps in the comments following section 2842 the intent of the
legislature is better stated:
Each spouse has the power to manage community property without the consent
or concurrence of the other, except in instances deemed of such importance to
the well-being of the family that concurrence is required. Other sections provide
instances of such importance to commerce that one spouse is entitled to act to
the exclusion of the other. See Secs. 2843, 2844.
LA. R.S. 9:2842, comment (Supp. 1978). The concept of general management authority
under section 2842 ideally should not have combined the power to dispose of separate
property, a right in no way restricted by the matrimonial regime, with the power to
dispose of community property, a right of which very little is left after excluding those
exceptions contained in the subsequent sections.
122. LA. R.S. 9:2843 (Supp. 1978).
123. LA. R.S. 9:2843, comment (Supp. 1978).
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power of attorney, but in either case, the spouse's appearance
can be worded to avoid any assumption, by such joinder, of a
more personal liability than is minimally necessary in order to
accomplish the transaction. Otherwise a spouse who simply
joins in a transaction, in proper person or through the use of a
power of attorney, would thereby incur liabilities and obliga-
tions as a party to the transaction, e.g., in warranting title"4
or repaying the debt,"5 which obligations may be satisfied
from the separate property of the spouse. 2
The unauthorized alienation, encumbrance, or lease of
community property by one spouse is voidable at the instance
of the other spouse.' The term "voidable" has been inter-
preted as rendering the contract enforceable until declared void
in an action brought for that purpose,2 8 unless in the meantime
the authority so exercised has been ratified,'29 either expressly
124. The warranty obligation of co-sellers is by its nature indivisible. Joint sellers
were found to be jointly liable for the return of the purchase price but solidarily liable
for eviction damages in Collins v. Slocum, 317 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 321 So. 2d 362 (La. 1975). This warranty liability can be limited by particular
agreement. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2503. For example, the parties could provide that the
warranty of the spouse is an in rem obligation only (limited to the value of the asset
conveyed or leased), that the property is conveyed without any warranty or recourse
whatsoever by the spouse, or only with a special warranty limited to the time the
property was owned by the spouse or particular vendors in the chain of title.
125. In order for the liability of co-obligors to be in solido, wherein "they are all
obliged to the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole," LA. Civ. CODE
art. 2091, solidary liability must be expressed rather than presumed. LA. Civ. CODE art.
2093. The liability of the wife could be limited by an express declaration that the
joinder of the wife is done solely for the purpose of expressing her consent in the
mortgaging of the community property without the wife's being named in the mortgage
as a named mortgagor or executing any note as a co-maker. LA. R.S. 10:3-401 (Supp.
1974). In the case of collateral mortgages, where the note given is not an evidence of
the debt but is to be pledged to secure an underlying obligation or obligations, the
mortgage might also contain the consent from the wife that the collateral mortgage
note (technically an asset of the community) be pledged by the husband from time to
time for debts past or future as convenience may require.
126. LA. R.S. 9:2849-50 (Supp. 1978). This is to be contrasted with the concept
under present law whereby the wife is given the opportunity to reject the community
and thereby avoid personal responsibility or the encumbrance of her separate assets
to satisfy community obligations arising out of community contracts executed solely
by her husband. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2410.
127. LA. R.S. 9:2846 (Supp. 1978).
128. Plick v. Toye Bros. Auto & Taxicab Co., 127 So. 59 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1930);
Lacoste v. Guidroz, 47 La. Ann. 295 (1895). See also LA. Civ. CODE art. 1840.
129. Nelson v. Walker, 250 La. 545, 197 So. 2d 619 (1967); Bolding v. Eason Oil
Co., 248 La. 269, 178 So. 2d 246 (1965). See also LA. CIv. CODE art. 1840 which provides:
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or impliedly.'3 The action for nullity or rescission of a contract
may be brought within ten years, 3' unless the situation is one
warranting the five year prescription.
3 1
Conspicuously missing from the requirement of section
"Contracts, however, made in the name of another, under void powers, will be valid,
if ratified by the principal before the other contracting party has signified his dissent
to the agreement." See also LA. CwV. CODE art. 1786 (not repealed by the new law),
which provides in part:
The authorization of the husband to the commercial contracts of the wife is
presumed by law, if he permits her to trade in her own name; to her contracts
for necessaries for herself and family, where he does not himself provide them;
and to all her other contracts, when he is himself a party to them. The unauthor-
ized contracts made by married women, like the acts of minors, may be made
valid after the marriage is dissolved, either by express or implied ratification.
130. In Nelson v. Walker, 250 La. 545, 563, 197 So. 2d 619, 625 (1967), the court
found that where a wife after her contractual incapacity ceased to exist due to divorce
accepted the benefits of rental on a piece of property and at various times occupied
the property, she therefore "ratified the partition agreement and settlement of alimony
claim and impliedly confirmed it after her incapacity ceased." Id. at 566, 197 So. 2d
at 627.
131. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2221 provides: "In all cases, in which the action of nullity
or of rescission of an agreement, is not limited to a shorter period by [a] particular
law, that action may be brought within ten years." The Nelson v. Walker court pointed
out that at the time the wife signed the purchase agreement in 1964, ten years had
elapsed since the date of cessation of her incapacity, therefore in 1964 her title to the
property was "good, valid,' and merchantable, not suggestive of litigation, and she was
able to convey it to a purchaser under an act translative of title." 250 La. at 566, 197
So. 2d at 627. In Succession of Nelson, 224 La. 731, 70 So. 2d 665 (1953), a case
involving an alleged simulated sale, the court held that the action to set aside the sale
was barred by ten year prescription, figured "from the time of the transfer of the
property." In Byrd v. Byrd, 230 La. 260, 88 So. 2d 214 (1956), a suit by a widow to
annul and cancel an act of conveyance of the community property by the husband,
the court affirmed the ten year prescription of Nelson v. Walker, but distinguished
Nelson because it involved a relative nullity. The nullity in Byrd was found to be
absolute, and thus, based on public policy the action of nullity was imprescriptible.
The First Circuit in Brooke v. Brooke, 132 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961), exam-
ined an alleged simulation, but found that the action to nullify the sale prescribed in
ten years, rejecting a plea of five year prescription, citing Succession of Nelson.
132. LA. Cw. CODE art. 3542 provides: "The following actions are prescribed by
five years: That for the nullity or rescission of contracts, testaments or other acts
. ." If, however, a contract is found to be absolutely null, then the nullity can never
be prescribed. See Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Schwob, 203 La. 175, 13 So. 2d 782 (1943).
In Louisiana Sulphur Mining Co. v. Brimstone, 143 La. 743, 748, 79 So. 324, 326 (1918),
the court held that article 3542 was not applicable to an action to have decreed null a
contract void on its face. The act of sale in question had a resolution attached authoriz-
ing only the sale of a right of way and the court held that the sale "insofar as it purports
to convey title to anything more than a right of way or servitude, [was] null on its
face." 143 La. at 749, 79 So. at 326.
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2843 is a provision with respect to the acquiring of community
property by either spouse without the concurrence of the
other. ' To the contrary, section 2843 specifically provides that
encumbrances "created by the operation of law" do not require
the concurrence of the spouses. This vesting in each spouse of
equal and unlimited authority to purchase for the community,
and thereby, for example, create a vendor's lien and privilege,
is repeated in a portion of the comment to this section stipulat-
ing that encumbrances imposed by law are excepted from the
requirement of joinder.'3 ' Thus, for example, a transaction by
one spouse acting alone could result in a valid vendor's privi-
lege or mechanic's or materialman's lien affecting movable or
immovable community property. Similarly, as pointed out in
the legislative comment, "the recordation of a judgment
against a spouse results in a judicial mortgage on community
property situated in the parish of recordation."'35 Although
either spouse under this section will be able to bind the com-
munity with a vendor's lien or privilege arising out of the un-
paid portion of the sales price, or with a resolutory condition
arising out of the failure to pay or to perform obligations of the
purchaser contained in the sale of movable or immovable prop-
erty, neither spouse, without the concurrence of the other, will
be permitted to bind the community in connection with the
execution of a promissory note or mortgage on the immovable
property being purchased.'36 This contrast will entail close
scrutiny of all transactions between and by spouses.
Due to the provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code dealing
with mandate,' 3 which are not amended by the new act, it is
133. The Law Institute's reporter had suggested that "[e]ach spouse should
have equal power to acquire, manage, control, or dispose of all community assets and
liabilities or to bind the assets of the community." Riley, supra note 63, at 575 (empha-
sis added).
134. LA. R.S. 9:2843, comment (Supp. 1978).
135. Id.
136. A mortgage granted at the time of purchase is separate and distinct from a
vendor's lien and privilege or a resolutory condition which are imposed as a matter of
law. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2561, 2564; Louis Werner Saw Mill Co. v. White, 205 La. 242,
17 So. 2d 264 (1944). The granting of a mortgage on immovable property at the time
of its purchase is not an encumbrance created by operation of law and is not therefore
excluded from the concurrence requirement of section 2843, although it is conceivable
that the same impact on the community will result.
137. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2985-3034.
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necessary, before management authority can safely be relied
upon with respect to real estate transactions, for such authority
to be expressly granted. This is true whether the authority is
intended to be general for all affairs, or special for one affair
only,' 3 and regardless of whether it authorizes buying, selling,
encumbering, accepting or rejecting a succession, contracting
a loan or acknowledging a debt, executing or endorsing bills of
exchange or promissory notes, or acting as surety. 131 In Civil
Code article 2997140 this rule is made specifically applicable to
the power to sell or to buy.
Our courts have held that to comply with this requirement
the terms of the proposed sale or purchase must be mentioned
in the power of attorney."' Additionally, while the property
need not be specifically described, it is preferable to give the
general area by parish or parishes where the property is lo-
cated,' although some practitioners have accepted powers of
138. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2994. See also LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 694, wherein an agent
is granted the procedural capacity to sue "when specially authorized to do so," and
article 695, wherein a wife is given similar authority to sue for the husband "when
specially authorized to do so by her husband." See also LA. Civ. CODE art. 2996 which
provides: "If it be necessary to alienate or give a mortgage, or do any other act of
ownership, the power must be express."
139. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2278, 3039.
140. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2997 provides:
Thus the power must be express and special for the following purposes:
To sell or to buy.
To incumber of hypothecate.
To accept or reject a succession.
To contract a loan or acknowledge a debt.
To draw or indorse bills of exchange or promissory notes.
To compromise or refer a matter to arbitration.
To make a transaction in matters of litigation; and in general where things to
be done are not merely acts of administration, or such as facilitate such acts.
A mandate to buy or sell must be express and special; if conceived only in general
terms, it does not suffice. Lake v. LeJeune, 226 La. 48, 74 So. 2d 899 (1954). See also
Bolding v. Eason Oil Co., 248 La. 269, 178 So. 2d 246 (1965).
141. The following language used in a power of attorney was held not to include
authority to sell real estate: power to "make [such] purchases and sales as may be
necessary . . . ." Sanders v. Ohio Oil Co., 155 La. 740, 99 So. 583 (1924). See also
Fleming v. Romero, 342 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 50 (La.
1977); Comment, Construction of Powers of Attorney in Louisiana, 23 TuL. L. Rv. 242
(1948).
142. See Boykin & Lang v. Wright, 11 La. Ann. 531 (1856). A power of attorney
to sell and convey all of the real estate of the principal in a certain parish sufficiently
describes the property. Rownd v. Davidson, 113 La. 1047, 37 So. 965 (1905). Indefinite-
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attorney or resolutions to sell any and all lands belonging to the
principal wherever located.4 3
Of all the provisions in the new law involving the aliena-
tion or encumbrance of community immovable property, per-
haps the one most likely to be misinterpreted at first reading,
and therefore the one that should command the greatest scru-
tiny by an attorney in real estate practice, is the last sentence
in section 2843: "A spouse may expressly confer upon the other
spouse the sole and irrevocable right to alienate, encumber, or
lease a community immovable or a community business or all
or substantially all of the assets of a community business.' 44
The use of the words "expressly" and "a" in this section, as
amplified by the comments to the section calling for "a partic-
ular community immovable," requires a specific, express and
special power of attorney as to a particular piece of community
ness of the description of the property in a power of attorney is cured by definiteness
of description in the deed executed by virtue of the power. Valentine v. Hawley, 37
La. Ann. 303 (1885).
143. A description of "all real estate in the state" belonging to the principal and
mentioning the parish or parishes in which the land was located was held to be suffi-
cient in Tensas Delta Land Co. v. Fleischer, 132 La. 1021, 62 So. 129 (1913). This case
was cited with approval by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Resweber v. Daspit,
240 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970), as authority for the holding that in Louisiana
it is not necessary that the mandate to sell real estate be both express and special as
required in Louisiana Civil Code article 2997, but need only be express as required in
article 2996. The court commented that "this holding in effect strikes the word 'special'
from Art. 2997." 240 So. 2d at 379. In Resweber it was held that a power of attorney
to sell all or any part of real estate of the principal was valid even though no further
description of property was contained in the mandate. The particular language that
was approved was contained in a printed form which merely stated "all or any part or
parts of the real, personal or mixed estate of the said .... 240 So. 2d at 377. For a
comment on this decision, see The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1970-1971 Term-Mandate, 32 LA. L. Rv. 165, 231 (1972), in which the writer suggests
that the same decision could have been reached not by striking the word "special" from
article 2997 but by simply applying Civil Code article 2994 to the mandate. LA. Civ.
CODE art. 2994 reads: "It may be either general for all affairs, or special for one affair
only."
144. LA. R.S. 9:2843, comment (Supp. 1978), provides in part:
A spouse may expressly confer upon the other spouse the sole right to alienate,
encumber, or lease a particular community immovable or a particular com-
munity business or all or substantially all of the assets of a particular com-
munity business. The right conferred may be irrevocable although no considera-
tion is given. The right conferred and the revocability of the right may be of
unlimited duration, for a definite period of time, or until the happening of an
uncertain or certain event.
(Emphasis added.)
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immovable property in order for one spouse to represent the
other in a community real estate transaction.'14 Is it necessary
that the new law, with respect to community immovables, be
so much more restrictive than the codal provisions on mandate
regulating one spouse's representation of another with regard
to separate immovables? This question is even more significant
when one considers that elsewhere in the new law the parties
are permitted to modify the contractual marital regime as they
wish, which modification could include a general power of at-
torney regarding community immovables signed by both par-
ties before a notary public and two witnesses and recorded in
the mortgage records.' 4
The power of attorney enabling one spouse to act for the
other with respect to community immovables under the new
law may be made irrevocable although no consideration be
given, and the revocability of the right may be of unlimited
duration or for a definite period of time;147 but it is not specifi-
cally required to be in authentic form as is required for the
wife's general disclaimer under the present law"81 or as is re-
145. While no authority is required for either spouse to purchase immovable
property for the community, nevertheless the granting of authority to one spouse to
sell community immovables must be limited to a particular community immovable.
One might even interpret this section to require that the exact description of the
particular piece of community immovable involved in the transaction be included in
toto in the power of attorney by which one spouse represents another, although it is
doubtful that the legislature intended this result. This new provision is inconsistent
first with present Civil Code article 2334, wherein the wife is permitted to waive the
requirement of her consent without specifying the particular piece of property in-
volved, and also with other provisions of section 2843 itself, which do not require
consent for acquiring community immovables or incurring a debt resulting in an en-
cumbrance imposed by law on community immovables.
146. See text at note 31, supra.
147. For the text of the pertinent part of the legislative comment to section 2843,
see note 144, supra.
148. LA. Civ. CoDE art. 2334, repealed by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, provides that
where the title to immovable property stands in the name of both husband and wife,
or where title to community immovable property declared to be the family home
stands in the name of the husband alone, the requirement that it may not be leased,
mortgaged or sold by the husband without the wife's written authority or consent
"shall not apply where the wife has made a declaration by authentic act that her
authority or consent are not required for such lease, sale or mortgage and has filed such
declaration in the mortgage and conveyance records of the parish in which the property
is situated." Id.
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quired for the marriage contract under the new law.'49 Presum-
ably the power of attorney could be any written instrument,' 0
since it has been held that the instrument need not be in au-
thentic form to be self-proving but may be an act under private
-signature,'5 ' except with respect to mortgages on immovable
property.'52 While it is customary to record a power of attorney
to sell in the conveyance records of the parish in which the
immovable property is situated, it is not required. Such recor-
dation should be done, however, for the sake of preservation 5 3
in order to avoid the inconvenience of later having to determine
whether a power of attorney, referred to as having been at-
tached to a particular instrument, was in fact attached al-
though not recorded with the instrument.'54
. Determining the minimum requirements for the aliena-
tion, encumbrance, lease or even acquisition of immovable
149. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp. 1978). Since one spouse under the new law may
confer upon the other a power of attorney under section 2843, one would not expect
that the legislature intended that the power of attorney be either incorporated in the
marriage contract, or, if by separate agreement, that the form be an authentic act
passed before a notary public and two witnesses, or that it be recorded in the mortgage
records of the parish where the parties are domiciled, or where the immovable property
is located. See text at note 31, supra.
150. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2992. It has been held that if the ultimate contract must
be in writing then the power of attorney authorizing one to make the contract must
also be in writing. Opelousas-St. Landry Bank & Trust Co. v. Bruner, 13 La. App. 337,
125 So. 507 (1929). The power of attorney dealing with real estate must be written.
Turner v. Snype, 162 La. 117, 110 So. 109 (1926).
151. Weinhart v. Weinhart, 214 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 253
La. 57, 216 So. 2d 305 (1968), held that it is not essential for a power of attorney "to
be in authentic form. An act under private signature is equally as effective in this
situation. ... 214 So. 2d at 258.
152. Foreclosure by executory process with respect to real estate mortgages re-
quires the petition for executory process to be supported by authentic evidence. LA.
CODE CIv. P. arts. 2634-36. If authentic evidence is lacking, executory process is una-
vailable and the creditor's remedy is by ordinary process. See American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Carson Homes, Inc., 316 So. 2d 732 (La. 1975), wherein it was held that a
mortgage executed in the presence of only one witness, with the notary and second
witness signing the instrument at a later time, is not an authentic act such as would
support executory process. See also Margolis v. Allen Mort. & Loan Corp., 268 So. 2d
714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972). Thus the power of attorney must be in authentic form
and preferably recorded with the mortgage or sale with mortgage if executory process
is to be available.
153. Rownd v. Davidson, 113 La. 1047, 37 So. 965 (1905).
154. LA. R.S. 13:3729 (1950) is known as the ancient records doctrine. Missing
powers of attorney and resolutions to instruments that have been recorded for more
than thirty years are not required in order to show the authority of the person acting.
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property in Louisiana by married persons is a subject demand-
ing further study by the attorney in real estate practice, both
when drafting instruments as well as when reviewing prior doc-
umentation for marketable title. Changes of particular impor-
tance in this area are 1) those requiring the concurrence of the
spouses for the alienation, encumbrance or lease of, but not for
the acquisition of, a community immovable and 2) the change
requiring that the mandate for this purpose be specific, express
and special as to a particular community immovable, a re-
quirement which goes far beyond that presently contained in
the Code for the vesting in a third party of authority to act for
another in real estate transactions.
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to review significant aspects of
the effect Louisiana's new Matrimonial Regime Law will have
on real estate practice in the state, not so much to underscore
areas needing legislative clarification or judicial interpretation,
as to draw attention to those practices now prevailing that do
not comply with the new law. Major conceptual changes de-
serving more study include the extent to which spouses may
legally contract with each other; the characterization of the
nature of each spouse's undivided ownership interest in com-
munity property as "present," word usage which, after a review
of the evolution of the source material, now appears more polit-
ically and sociologically symbolic than legally significant; and
the formalities required for alienating or encumbering, but not
acquiring, community property, including an unrealistically
restrictive one that "a particular community immovable" be
described in the power of attorney. Until the Matrimonial Re-
gime Law, particularly those sections dealing with the aliena-
tion or encumbering of community property, has been clarified
by the legislature or interpreted by the courts, an attorney in
Louisiana real estate practice might prefer to require both
spouses, in proper person or appearing through an express and
special power of attorney describing the particular real estate
involved, to sign all transactions involving immovable prop-
erty. In examining title, an attorney may need to run all names
for the entire period examined in both the conveyance and
mortgage indices so as to detect all marriage contracts and
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amendments made by prior owners of the property concerned.
A product of several years of concentrated work, the new
Matrimonial Regime Law represents, particularly regarding
equality in the management of community property, a change
whose effects cannot be underestimated.' The drafters of the
new law, undoubtedly faced with the threat that Louisiana's
entire community property system might be declared unconsti-
tutional,' may have felt as if they were caught between
"Scylla and Charybdis." Despite these mitigating circumstan-
ces, by introducing new terms not precisely defined or inter-
preted consistently by the courts, the legislature may be leav-
ing key words open to interpretations not now intended. "7
155. Not since the late 19th and early 20th century, when reforms were
related to that period of social change commonly called the Industrial Revolu-
tion, have matrimonial property systems been in such a state of upheaval.
Indeed, current changes are probably even more profound than those that oc-
curred at the turn of the century.
Glendon, Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49
TuL. L. REv. 21, 23 (1974).
156. In light of the dubious constitutionality of Louisiana's matrimonial
regime provisions there is a need for revision by the state legislature. The seven
other states which employ a community of gains concept have already changed
their provisions concerning the manager of the community.
Note, Matrimonial Regime Reform-A Constitutional Necessity, 38 LA. L. Rlv. 642,
651 (1978).
157. The legislature in using a word should make it mean precisely what they
intend it to mean, neither more nor less, particularly in the area of real estate law.
See, e.g., Lewis Carroll's penetrating exchange between Humpty Dumpty and Alice
in "Through the Looking Glass,"
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means
just what I choose it to mean-neither more.nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all."
L. CARROLL; Through the Looking Glass, in THE COMPLEU WORKS OF LEwis CARROLL
214.
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